Vulnerability exploitation is reportedly one of the main a ack vectors against computer systems. Yet, most vulnerabilities remain unexploited by a ackers. It is therefore of central importance to identify vulnerabilities that carry a high 'potential for a ack'. In this paper we rely on Symantec data on real a acks detected in the wild to identify a trade-o in the Impact and Complexity of a vulnerability, in terms of a acks that it generates; exploiting this e ect, we devise a readily computable estimator of the vulnerability's A ack Potential that reliably estimates the expected volume of a acks against the vulnerability. We evaluate our estimator performance against standard patching policies by measuring foiled a acks and demanded workload expressed as the number of vulnerabilities entailed to patch. We show that our estimator signi cantly improves over standard patching policies by ruling out low-risk vulnerabilities, while maintaining invariant levels of coverage against a acks in the wild. Our estimator can be used as a rst aid for vulnerability prioritisation to focus assessment e orts on high-potential vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
e identi cation of objective and readily available measures for vulnerability risk is a central part of the vulnerability mitigation process [13, 15, 16] . Industry standards such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) have been developed to create a common framework over which evaluate vulnerability severity and guide the vulnerability mitigation process [15] ; a CVSS assessment produces two nal components:
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2) e CVSS-score, a nal severity score that synthesises the information in the CVSS-vector in a single value between 0 and 10 (less severe to more severe).
e CVSS-score is widely used as a metric for vulnerability management; for example, PCI-DSS, the worldwide security standard for systems handling credit-card data, sets a 'hard threshold' for vulnerability patching at a CVSS score greater or equal to 4 (10 being the maximum) [13] . Similarly, NIST's SCAP standard uses the CVSS-score as the metric of reference for vulnerability assessment across industry sectors, including consumer systems [14] .
Unfortunately, recent studies show that the CVSS-score does not correlate well with a acks in the wild, leading to sub-optimal vulnerability management policies [2, 6, 16] . is is particularly unfortunate as the CVSS score gives a clear, well-de ned and readily available assessment of the vulnerability that can be used 'out-ofthe-box' to take a rst security decision on whether the vulnerability is (not) likely to represent a signi cant risk [5] . is is especially relevant as recent empirical [1] as well as analytical [3] ndings indicate that most vulnerabilities remain unexploited by a ackers. It is therefore especially important to devise measures that rule out 'low-risk' vulnerabilities to prioritize ne-grained assessments on high-potential vulnerabilities.
In this paper we investigate whether the information reported in the CVSS-vector may provide useful information, otherwise lost in the aggregate score, to estimate the a ack potential of a vulnerability. Leveraging on real a ack data from Symantec, we show the existence of a clear trade-o between exploitation complexity and impact in terms of number of expected a acks observed in the wild. We propose to leverage this trade-o to identify a new measure, 'A ack Potential', that can be readily estimated from the CVSS-vector and used as a measure of vulnerability prioritization next to the standard CVSS-score metric (e.g. in a standard security triage process [5] ). Building on top of previous related work [2] , we show that patching policies based on our estimator show a comparable or be er reduction in risk than current best practices by requiring an essentially halved workload in terms of patched vulnerabilities without losing ability of foiling a acks in the wild. is paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces our datasets. Section 3 gives a rst overview of exploits in Impact and Complexity. In Section 4 we introduce the A ack Potential measure, and in Section 5 we evaluate our estimator against real a acks in the wild. Section 6 discusses threats to validity; related work is presented in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes the paper. 
DATASETS
Our analysis is based on three datasets:
(1) e National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is usually considered the public universe of vulnerabilities held by NIST. Our NVD samples reports 49599 vulnerabilities (CVE identi ers).
(2) To approximate a collection of vulnerabilities used in the wild we have used Symantec's A ackSignature 1 and reatExplorer 2 public data (SYM). It contains all entries identi ed as malware (local threats) or remote a acks (network threats) by Symantec's commercial products. It reports 1277 vulnerabilities.
(3) Symantec's WINE data sharing program [7] collects records of a acks for a ack signatures and CVEs reported in SYM. Our WINE sample has been collected in Summer 2012 and reports 2M a acks detected between August 2009 and June 2012 against 10 6 systems [7] , and exploiting 408 vulnerabilities.
EXPLORATIVE ATTACK DATA ANALYSIS
CVSS classi es vulnerability Impact over an assessment of the classic Con dentiality, Integrity, Availability properties, expressed in terms of (C)omplete, (P)artial, (N)one losses. Figure 1 reports the trend in volumes of a acks per CIA impact type. Only CIA congurations for which there is an entry in WINE are reported (the interested reader can refer to [2] for a more detailed analysis of incidence of impact types on vulnerabilities and exploits). e Y-axis is in logarithmic scale. It is immediately evident that two levels of prevalence of CIA impacts in a acks can be identi ed: vulnerabilities with C,I,A assessment <C,C,C><P,P,P>,<N,N,P> are up to 5 orders of magnitude more exploited than most other impact types. <C,C,C> and <P,P,P> vulnerabilities are among the most targeted; this matches the observation that these impact types are among the most common overall in NVD [2] . On the other hand, the high incidence of <N,N,P> vulnerabilities in WINE does not match a high presence of this impact type in NVD [2] . Further, it is useful to observe that <N,N,P> vulnerabilities are more commonly exploited in the wild than <N,N,C> vulnerabilities, despite a lower overall impact (Partial Availability as opposed to Complete Availability impact). Some light can be shed on the apparent mismatch between volume of a acks and relative impact of a ected vulnerabilities by considering the Access Complexity levels reported in the NVD. We nd that 95% of a acked <N,N,P> vulnerabilities have a Low CVSS Access Complexity, and that more than 50% of <N,N,C> vulnerabilities are scored as High or Medium complexity. is suggests that the combination of CVSS Impact and Access Complexity assessments may provide a useful rst indicator of presence of exploit in the wild.
Trends of a acks in Impact and Complexity. Following o cial guidelines [11] , we categorise vulnerabilities by their impact and complexity over three levels for each metric: HIGH , MEDIU M, LOW . Vulnerability characteristics are identi ed in short by the tuple <AC=X,I=Y>, with x and the assessments for the Access Complexity and Impact metrics respectively. Table 1 reports the relative fractions of vulnerabilities in SYM for each combination. It is evident that Low complexity and Medium complexity, High impact vulnerabilities are over-represented in SYM with respect to NVD. For example, <AC=M, I=H> vulnerabilities constitute 32.5% of vulnerabilites in SYM, whereas they represent only 7.65% of vulnerabilities in NVD. Similarly, <AC=M, I={M,L}> vulnerabilities are underrepresented in SYM with respect to occurrences in NVD.
In Figure 2 we report a ack volumes in time aggregated by {complexity, impact} types. e Y-axis is in logarithmic scale. In the plot the <AC=M, I=L> tuple is not reported as many data points in the time series are zeros. e great majority of exploited vulnerabilities are Low Access Complexity ones; among these, the most a acked are High Impact vulnerabilities. Medium Access Complexity vulnerabilities are massively exploited only if their impact on the victim systems is High. e resulting picture is therefore rather simple: the majority of exploits are for easy vulnerabilities to exploit, regardless of their Impact type. Medium complexity vulnerabilities are less targeted (by two orders of magnitude), and only if the exploitation impact is High. Essentially we can see that Low Complexity and High Impact vulnerabilities remain at large the favorite vector for a acks while the remaining Low Complexity or Medium Complexity but High Impact are still very popular albeit by varying degrees (oscillating in 1 order of magnitude below the top category). e other vulnerability types remain below at several orders of magnitude. is suggests that the combination of Access Complexity and Impact may help identifying useful measures for incidence of a acks.
POTENTIAL OF ATTACK
To more precisely describe the trends outlined in Section 3 we de ne pA as an empirical measure of the potential of a ack of a vulnerability over a set of vulnerable machines. 3 Our pA measure is speci ed as
where A is the number of a acks observed in the wild for the vulnerability . A pA of 6 corresponds to one million a acks in the wild in our sample (i.e. one per systems on average). A pA = 2 indicates 100 recorded a acks. 4 Figure 3 reports the probability density distribution of pA for vulnerabilities reported in WINE. e x axis reports the pA values and the y axis the incidence of each pA. pA ranges in [0..7.5]. Its distribution spikes at pA ≈ 1 and pA ≈ 6. 50% of vulnerabilities are below a pA of 1.6, and 75% below 3.4. is means that 50% and 75% of vulnerabilities receive respectively up to about 50 (10 1.6 ) and 2500 (10 3.4 ) a acks in the wild over the observation period. Impact Score
Acc. Complexity Score
Estimation of vulnerability a ack potential. We exploit the impactcomplexity e ect described in Section 3 to estimate the volume of a acks that a vulnerability can potentially receive if an a ack for it exists in the wild. Given the high incidence of unexploited vulnerabilities in the wild [12] , a desirable property for our estimator is to maintain high true negative rates (something that the bare CVSS-score unfortunately does not do [2] ), whereas false positives can be ruled out by more ne-grained assessments later in a triage process [5] . To build our estimator, we rst assign to each Impact and Access Complexity value an ordinal value derived directly from the original CVSS v2 speci cation [11] . Table 2 reports the assigned scores. Leveraging the logarithmic relation between a acks in the wild and CVSS measures, we de ne the estimated a ack potential E[pA] as:
e estimator in Eq. 2 will return values of E[pA] ∈ [0, 10]. Because our WINE set is collected over 10 6 machines [7] , we de ne the following discrete levels:
As an application example of our measure, Table 3 reports the pA and E[pA] estimates for ten example vulnerabilities randomly sampled from WINE. Table 4 reports overall results for the full WINE dataset. e estimator performs generally well, with only 6% of the assessments being under-estimations of real pA (i.e. false negatives). Importantly, Table 4 shows that our estimator is a conservative one, in that when it does not match the correct pA category, it overestimates it. It therefore does not lead to ignoring vulnerabilities that should be treated. Among the false-negatives, 87% of the estimation error is limited to one level only on the discrete scale. Note that because all vulnerabilities considered in Table 4 have at least an exploit in the wild (as they are reported in WINE), the reported indicators do not represent real-world performance of the estimator. We give full a consideration of this in the next section.
AN APPLICATION TO ILLUSTRATIVE PATCHING POLICIES
To illustrate the practical application of our estimator to vulnerability management practices, we de ne a patching policy as a process that, given in input vulnerability data, outputs a Patch/NotPatch decision. A patching policy de nes a threshold above which the Patch decision is triggered. We de ne the following policies:
• All ulns: no risk factor is identi ed; under this policy every vulnerability is patched.
• CV SS ≥ 4: patches all vulnerabilities to which is assigned a CVSS score equal or higher than 4. is policy corresponds to the PCI DSS recommendation for management of credit card holders data [13] . 
Calculation of Risk Reduction
To evaluate the e cacy of the di erent patching policies, we compute the frequency with which each policy identi es a vulnerability in SYM. To evaluate each risk policy we randomly sample a vulnerability from NVD with the same characteristics in terms of so ware and year of disclosure as in SYM [2, 6] . We then evaluate the count of sampled vulnerabilities that the policy marks as 'high risk' (i.e. above the threshold identi ed by the policy), and compare that to the vulnerability's actual presence in SYM. e output of our experiment is represented in Table 5 . e rst row identi es the vulnerabilities that need be treated according to the decision variables. e risk entailed by selected vulnerabilities is computed on the rst row, and is the ratio R t r eat ed = a/(a + b).
e bo om row identi es the vulnerabilities that are not selected for treatment (below the identi ed threshold). e risk associated with the untreated vulnerabilities is the ratio R unt r eat ed = c/(c +d).
e di erence between the two is de ned in the literature as risk reduction (RR) [8] . For a xed number of vulnerabilities to patch, policies with a higher risk reduction identify a greater fraction of exploited vulnerabilities than policies with a lower risk reduction.
Formally, let Attacked be the set of vulnerabilities for which a acks in the wild have been reported and Selected the set of vulnerabilities above a policy's threshold. e risk of treated (untreated) vulnerabilities for a patching policy R t r eat ed (R unt r eat ed ) and the risk reduction (RR) of a policy are de ned as:
R unt r eat ed = |Attacked ∩ ¬Selected | |¬Selected | (4) RR = R t r eat ed − R unt r eat ed (5) To implement the procedure we perform a bootstrapped casecontrol study as described in [2] . Because di erent so ware types may lead to di erent a ack frequencies, we identify four so ware categories in SYM to control for in our sample [4, 6] : IE, PLUGIN, PROD and WINDOWS. e classi cation is performed by manually assigning so ware names to a category and then using regular expressions to match each CVE to the respective category.
Risk reduction in the wild
With this formulation we can compare the policies identi ed in Section 5. Table 6 reports the results of the analysis. e rst row reports the results for the All ulns policy. With reference to our NVD dataset sample, this would require analyzing more than 14 thousand vulnerabilities 5 . Risk Reduction can not be computed for this policy as no vulnerability remains unselected for patching. Among all policies, Comp = L and Comp ≤ M achieve the lowest risk reductions. is example is however useful in be er illustrating the mechanism implemented by the RR metric. Whereas Comp = L is a subset of Comp ≤ M, its risk-reduction is signi cantly higher; this may result counter-intuitive as the la er contains all vulnerabilities included in the former. However, note that by including additional vulnerabilities that are not a acked, Comp ≤ M decreases R t r eat ed , thus resulting in a lower overall RR. A high RR results therefore from policies that well balance the risk of selected vulnerabilities with the 'residual' risk that characterizes unselected vulnerabilities. e largest risk reduction is achieved by the policy based on the impact-complexity trade-o (RR = 26.8%). e second largest RR is achieved by a policy based on PCI-DSS. e former requires to analyze 8.3 thousand vulnerabilities and the la er almost 14 thousand. From this perspective the policy E[pA] = H seems to have the best trade-o : lowest number of vulnerabilities and best risk reduction. Table 7 reports the risk reduction for the aggregate case and the experiment for the controls. Comparisons are by row. As we can see from the table, the relative ordering is essentially preserved for all control factors. With few exceptions, the preferred global policy remains the preferred one even when restricted to a speci c so ware category. WINDOWS vulnerabilities are here an exception, showing that the trade-o may not be a good proxy for this so ware category and that other variables should be considered. IE shows mixed behavior with E[pA] = H performing similarly to CV SS ≥ 4, but worse than Comp = L in terms of RR. A negative RR indicates that the residual risk in the 'untreated' vulnerabilities is higher than the risk for the treated vulnerabilities.
pA reduction in the wild
We now look at the the e cacy of each policy in reducing a acks in the wild. Table 8 reports, for each control, the amount of patching work required relative to the total for that so ware category and the reduction in pA. By looking at the pA and %V columns, it is possible to see that the E[pA] = H patching policy achieves the lowest workload (requiring to patch only 58% of the original volume of vulnerabilities), and still fully addresses pA in the wild throughout all so ware categories 6 .
Further, the results reported in Table 8 can be used to validate the risk reduction measure introduced in [2] . For RR to be a valid measure for patching policy e ectiveness, there should be a correspondence between the level of RR and the policy's e ectiveness in the wild. In Table 6 the 'PCI DSS' policy (patch all vulnerabilities with CV SS ≥ 4) and E[pA] = H have the highest risk reductions (23% and 26% respectively). Compl = L and Comp ≤ M showed a much lower RR, the la er being the worst. We nd this same ordering to be preserved in the evaluation in the wild reported in Table 8 . E[pA] = H represents the best trade-o between workload and reduction in pA, while Comp = L entails the lowest workload but at the price of a lower reduction in pA. Similar considerations can be done if we break down the analysis for the controls.
THREATS TO VALIDITY
External validity. WINE data is a representative sample of a acks detected in the wild against 'user machines'. Our conclusions are therefore limited to systems of the same nature: di erent dynamics may hold for server machines or specialized systems. Internal validity. Volumes of a acks against vulnerabilities may change by geographical area. It is possible that some vulnerabilities a acked only in particular areas or a ecting only particular systems of lower commercial interest for Symantec may not appear or are under-represented in our datasets. To address this, in our casecontrol study we control for possible factors for inclusion in SYM [2] . Further re nements may be needed to safely narrow the scope of our conclusions down to speci c user populations.
RELATED WORK
An analysis of the distribution of CVSS scores and subscores has been presented by Scarfone et al. in [15] . Frei et al. 's [9] studied the life-cycle of a vulnerability from exploit to patch. eir dataset is a composition of NVD, OSVDB and 'FVDB' (Frei's Vulnerability DataBase, obtained from the examination of security advisories for patches). e notion of vulnerability risk has been considered in [2] , where the authors show that the CVSS score as an aggregate number is not a satisfactory risk metric for vulnerabilities. Holm et al. [10] investigated through expert opinion which aspects of a vulnerability should be considered on top of the baseline CVSS assessment to be er represent risk of exploit. e present work extends this line of research by showing that the inner assessments in the CVSS framework can be instrumental for vulnerability prioritisation. Other work focused on the volume of a acks in the wild recorded against vulnerabilities. Allodi showed in [1] that vulnerability exploitation follows a heavy-tailed distribution, and that for some so ware types as li le as 5% of a acked vulnerabilities represent 95% of the risk in the wild. Similarly, Nayak et al. [12] showed that a ackers prefer certain vulnerabilities over others. Our work integrates these results by showing that part of the a acker's decision process is in uenced by a trade-o between the complexity and the impact of the vulnerability exploit.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated trends in vulnerability a acks per CVSS Impact and Exploitability types. We nd that there exists a clear-cut distinction in terms of a acks in the wild between low complexity, high impact vulnerabilities and high complexity, low impact vulnerabilities.
Leveraging this e ect we build an estimator of the A ack Potential of a vulnerability that provides a rst indicator of the risk of exploitation in the wild. e estimator presented in this work is straightforward to implement and can be used in foresight without pre-existing data on the volume of a acks in the wild for that vulnerability. We test our estimator against standard CVSS-based patching policies and show that it outperforms them in terms of foiled a acks and entailed workload. e A ack Complexity metric in the 3.0 release of CVSS re ects these observations.
